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The problem of unifying quantum mechanics with general relativity in a
quantum theory of gravity has led to proliferation of approaches, each mo-
tivated by particular desiderata for such a theory, but none offering more
than a partial solution to the riddle. Anyone venturing into quantum grav-
ity faces multitudinous challenges of a technical and mathematical, of a
physical and interpretational, and of a conceptual—indeed philosophical—
character. Some occasions call for altogether novel mathematical tools, oth-
ers for untested physical principles or seemingly contradictory combinations
of established physics, yet others present us with apparently non-sensical
implications for how the theory conceives of the world it seeks to describe.
(One is reminded of the many attempts to formulate mechanics and solve
the problem of the planets through the first half of the seventeenth cen-
tury.) Moreover, all approaches must chart their course in what so far is
empirically altogether inaccessible territory—we still await quantum grav-
ity’s Brahe and Kepler. This need for innovation unchecked by traditional
experimental data has led to a confusing abundance of approaches, engaging
in mostly friendly—but sometimes acrimonious—strife as well as in permis-
sive, and pervasive, trading zones.
Although philosophers have acknowledged many implications of relativ-
ity, they have done little to address the revolutionary accounts of space and
time found in quantum gravity; this special issue aims to start to fill that
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need, focussing on issues of particular philosophical salience. While different
approaches to quantum gravity are often based on rather different physical
principles, many of them share an important suggestion: that in some way
spacetime as we find it in our existing theories is not a fundamental ingredi-
ent of the world, but instead, like rainbows, plants or people, ‘emerges’ from
some deeper, non-spatiotemporal physics. What replaces spacetime and
what aspects of spacetime remain in the ontology of fundamental physics
differs, as one would expect, from approach to approach. But the idea that
the universe and its material content might not, at bottom, be ‘in’ space and
time, that these seemingly fundamental ingredients are just appearances of
something more fundamental, would, if borne out, shatter our conception
of the universe as profoundly as any scientific revolution before. It would
complete an intellectual journey from a flat Earth, through a geocentered
finite universe, an infinite Euclidean space, and a dynamical non-Euclidean
spacetime—to (perhaps) nothing at all at a fundamental level.
A skeptic might dismiss as premature the philosophical project of en-
gaging with what is very much science in action, not offering the warm
comfort of assured insight that received theories promise. We beg to differ
with this standoffish conception of philosophy of complete (hence dead) sci-
ence; indeed, we urge philosophers of physics to roll up their sleeves at this
opportune moment while the kitchen is still busy.
The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, while attempts to
unify quantum physics and general relativity may be legion, most research
programs have recently stalled, unable to remove major stumbling blocks
on their road to successful completion. Encouragingly, physicists are in-
creasingly aware of the need to reanalyze the philosophical foundations that
undergird quantum mechanics and general relativity, and to explore the new
concepts that appear in the partial unifications we possess, since they are
steps towards the needed concepts of a full unification. We suggest neither
that such work will suffice for a quantum theory of gravity, nor that philoso-
phers are uniquely qualified to undertake it, but we do believe philosophers
have something to contribute to such analytic work. Thus, philosophers
should not engage with physicists and mathematicians over quantum grav-
ity despite the theories’ provisional character, but precisely because these
theories are under construction.
The second kind of reasons are more selfish, as it were. The dishes start-
ing to emerge from the quantum gravity kitchen smell irresistably delicious
for a philosopher with a stake in the fundamental structure of our world.
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Brief outline of the contributions
Our own essay starts from the recognition that the fundamental structures
postulated and described in many quantum theories of gravity seem to be
quite different from any conceptions of space or time appearing in previous
theories, even including the spacetimes of general relativity. Naturally, this
divergence comes in degrees, and we give the reader a sense of the spec-
trum; we also show that the divergence occurs along different dimensions.
Our main goal is to argue that theories denying the fundamental existence of
spacetime are empirically coherent, i.e., that their truth does not undermine
the very reasons we have for accepting them as true. Addressing this ques-
tion requires us to survey how, formally speaking, spatiotemporal structures
can be derived from a variety of partial theories; and to understand why we
should consider such derivations as ‘physically salient’.
One family of approaches to quantum gravity, the ‘canonical’ theories,
takes classical general relativity as its point of departure and attempts to
quantize the gravitational field using a canonical quantization recipe. This
procedure very directly leads to the so-called ‘problem of time’, which seems
to entail that there cannot be any genuine physical change at the fundamen-
tal level. Furthermore, to the extent to which the basic structures in these
approaches are understood, their quantum states do not seem to lend them-
selves to a spatiotemporal interpretation. Lam and Esfeld investigate—
“from an ontologically serious point of view” as they insist—claims that
spacetime vanishes in the two main canonical approaches, quantum ge-
ometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity. They see a dilemma for those
who deny fundamental spacetime: either spacetime emerges from a non-
spatiotemporal structure—in which case one is hard pressed to explicate
how local beables can be regained—or it does not—in which case the task
at hand is to interpret the fundamental structures spatiotemporally. As we
have made clear in our contribution, we believe that there is no in principle
reason why grabbing the first horn cannot succeed.
Also starting out from general relativity, at least in spirit, but in ways
rather different from the canonical program, we find approaches such as
causal set theory which postulate some discrete causal structure ab initio.
In these approaches, the hope is to recover relativistic spacetimes as approx-
imations to the fundamental discrete structure in some appropriate large-
scale limit. D’Ariano and Tossini postulate a (1 + 1)-dimensional homoge-
neous lattice of causally related basal events and try to show how Minkowski
spacetime can emerge from their toy model in a continuum limit. However,
since no isotropic space can emerge from a classical homogeneous causal net-
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work in this limit, they argue that the isotropy of the propagation of signals
(and the full Lorentz covariance) can be restored if one takes into account
quantum superpositions of causal paths. In this sense, they conclude that
the quantum nature of the network is essential, particularly since perfectly
meaningful physics can be done at non-ultimate levels.
Of course, the other major approach to quantum gravity starts from high
energy physics, and quantum field theory: this route leads to string theory.
In this context, claims of emergence are often tied to claims of ‘background
independence’. String theory seems to violate an insight of general relativity
by imposing a spacetime of fixed geometry, but (as we sketch in our essay),
it is arguable that strong physical symmetries—‘dualities’—mean that the
geometry and topology of the background spacetime is not physically de-
terminate after all. The two essays on the topic, by Teh and by Rickles,
both address this issue in the context of ‘AdS/CFT duality’, according to
which physics cannot distinguish between one space and its boundary, or
hologram—thus, perhaps, even the dimensionality of spacetime is indeter-
minate. Both reach somewhat skeptical conclusions, but along the way
explain how such a symmetry is possible, and the meaning and significance
of duality and emergence.
There are less established approaches which fit into neither the canon-
ical nor the string camp. Among these alternatives we find the effective
field theory program, the focus of Crowther’s contribution. This program
conceives of general relativity and its relativistic spacetime as ‘effective’ low-
energy phenomena arising from some unknown high-energy physics, just as
condensed matter physics and its condensates arise from high-energy quan-
tum field theories. Given the oftentimes heuristic techniques used in the
approach, and given that what looks like a curved spacetime can easily be
obtained from many different high-energy theories (which, however, all rely
on some fixed, non-relativistic spacetime background), we should not take
the analogy between the ‘emergent’ relativistic spacetimes and the conden-
sates of condensed matter physics too seriously. In her discussion of the
emergence of relativistic spacetimes in the context of the effective field the-
ory program, Crowther helpfully contrasts two different directions that this
program can take: “top-down” from the more fundamental high-energy the-
ory to the effective low-energy theory, or “bottom-up” from the low-energy
theory (such as general relativity) in an attempt to find a high-energy theory
which might give rise to the effective physics used as vantage point.
The emergent-gravity program known as ‘stochastic gravity’ assumes
that relativistic spacetime (or, better, the gravitational field) emerges stochas-
tically in the hydrodynamic limit of the unknown fundamental quantum the-
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ory, i.e., as the collective quantum behaviour of more fundamental degrees
of freedom. The goal is to compute the corrections of increasing order to the
standard association of the expectation values of the quantum field and the
classical spacetime found in the semi-classical Einstein equations. The main
point of the program is not to venture a speculative fundamental theory only
tenuously connected to ‘old’ physics, but rather to start out from established
physics and to inch, step by step, into the unchartered territory. Mattingly
urges the methodological point that efforts should focus on “expanding our
explanatory resources” in this more modest and controlled way, rather than
to expose our theory building to many major reconceptualizations at once,
as is necessary if one attempts a fundamental theory directly. He takes this
point to be justified by the fact that any fundamental theory of quantum
gravity will have to pass through the sector studied by stochastic gravity.
A final approach in this broad category, as Bain explains, is to derive
spacetime physics from models based on solid state physics, via the effec-
tive field theory program for finding low energy physics (philosophers have
studied related issues in the context of renormalization theory). In the first
place, Bain discusses how one should think about emergence in the context
of effective fields. He goes on to show how the spacetime in which the solid
state fundamental physics is formulated makes a difference to the nature of
the emergence of the phenomenal spacetime to which it gives rise.
The final two essays focus on the classical side of the emergence rela-
tion. It is usually assumed that what has to be derived from a quantum
theory of gravity is an emergent classical spacetime metrical geometry. But
Knox argues that even in the case of the classical theory, physical spacetime
structure is captured by the inertial frame structure, which the full geometry
(over)represents—in this sense even classically spacetime is emergent, via an
approximation relation. (To see this point it’s important to distinguish the
structure of spatially extended inertial frames from that of spatially point-
like timelike geodesics.) On the one hand, this argument shifts realism from
the manifold of general relativity to concrete inertial frames (a cousin of
entity realism vs theory realism, as we see it); on the other, theories with
non-vanishing torsion make a gap between geometry and inertial frame more
visible. In addition to making a contribution to the interpretation of gen-
eral relativity, this paper raises questions of exactly what we need to emerge
from quantum gravity.
Finally, Hagar and Hemmo question, in principle, and through examples,
whether the idea of emergent spacetime is coherent. They interpret an
important exchange between Einstein and Swann to support their claim
that any derivation of spacetime will have to presuppose that length is well-
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defined. To that extent you can’t expect emergence of something from
nothing!
We are very grateful to our authors for the work that they have put
into these pieces. We are very excited to share them with the readers of
this special issue. Our call for papers asked for essays that would help start
a philosophical dialogue and investigation of quantum gravity—we can’t
imagine a better collection of papers to achieve just that. But now, of
course, it is over to our readers. We believe that you will find plenty in
these pages to educate and inspire you about these topics: we look forward
to reading and hearing your responses in the coming years.
Nick Huggett
Christian Wu¨thrich
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